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Table 3 Conditional effects of de Jure and de Facto political institutions on long-run development, 1850–2012

From: The rise and fall of Argentina

 Full sampleWithout Argentina
(1)(2)(3)(4)(5)(6)(7)(8)
De jure and de facto political institutions
 De jure (latent)0.026*** (0.001)0.026*** (0.001)0.021*** (0.002)0.018*** (0.001)0.027*** (0.001)0.026*** (0.001)0.021*** (0.002)0.018*** (0.001)
 De facto (latent)0.022*** (0.001)0.022*** (0.001)0.022*** (0.001)0.022*** (0.001)0.022*** (0.001)0.022*** (0.002)0.023*** (0.001)0.022*** (0.001)
Geography covariates
 Latitude − 0.002 (0.001)− 0.003*** (0.001)− 0.004*** (0.001) − 0.001 (0.002)− 0.003* (0.001)− 0.004*** (0.001)
 Longitude − 0.001** (0.0008)− 0.003*** (0.0008)− 0.005*** (0.0009) −0.001** (0.0008)− 0.003*** (0.0008)− 0.005*** (0.0009)
 Terrain ruggedness − 0.045 (0.049)− 0.021 (0.039)− 0.056 (0.045) − 0.037 (0.050)− 0.019 (0.041)0.059 (0.048)
 Soil quality 0.0006 (0.002)− 0.0006 (0.002)− 0.001 (0.002) 0.001 (0.002)− 0.0005 (0.003)0.001 (0.003)
 Desert 0.008 (0.009)− 0.006 (0.010)− 0.027*** (0.009) 0.014 (0.012)− 0.005 (0.012)− 0.025*** (0.009)
 Tropical 0.0002 (0.001)0.001 (0.001)0.003** (0.001) 0.0008 (0.002)0.001 (0.001)0.003*** (0.001)
 Distance to coast 0.001 (0.001)0.003*** (0.001)0.003*** (0.001) 0.001 (0.001)0.003*** (0.001)0.003** (0.001)
 Landlocked 0.263 (0.270)0.086 (0.192)− 0.493** (0.206) 0.232 (0.279)0.077 (0.197)− 0.501** (0.212)
 Precipitation − 0.230** (0.106)− 0.361*** (0.148)− 0.242*** (0.068) − 0.215* (0.118)− 0.363*** (0.101)− 0.239*** (0.082)
Legal history covariates
 English common law  − 0.381*** (0.148)− 0.653*** (0.147)  − 0.381*** (0.146)− 0.652*** (0.143)
 French civil law  − 0.528*** (0.131)− 0.881*** (0.138)  − 0.529*** (0.131)− 0.875*** (0.141)
 German civil law  omittedomitted  omittedomitted
 Scandinavian civil law  − 0.567*** (0.148)− 0.817*** (0.160)  − 0.570*** (0.149)− 0.810*** (0.179)
Culture covariates
 Ethnic fractionalization   − 0.808*** (0.346)   − 0.789*** (0.339)
 Linguistic fractionalization   1.134*** (0.386)   1.126*** (0.385)
 Religious fractionalization   − 0.186 (0.202)   − 0.178 (0.225)
 Constant term6.701*** (0.100)8.316*** (0.698)9.641*** (0.655)9.092*** (0.539)6.673*** (0.098)8.116*** (0.827)9.642*** (0.763)9.026*** (0.746)
 Number of observations45644564456445644401440144014401
 Number of countries2828282827272727
 Number of years163163163163163163163163
 Wald test (p-value)0.0000.0000.0000.0000.0000.0000.0000.000
 Adjusted R20.730.760.770.780.740.760.770.78
  1. The table presents the effects of de jure and de facto political institutions on long-run development. The outcome variable is the natural log of per capita GDP (1990 Geary–Khamis international $). Standard errors are adjusted for the serially correlated stochastic disturbances across and within countries using the finite-sample distribution function, intraclass multiway clustering scheme (Cameron et al. 2011). The asterisks denote statistically significant coefficients at 10 percent (*), 5 percent (**), and 1 percent (***)