Table 3 Conditional effects of de Jure and de Facto political institutions on long-run development, 1850–2012
| Â | Full sample | Without Argentina | ||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
(1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) | |
De jure and de facto political institutions | ||||||||
 De jure (latent) | 0.026*** (0.001) | 0.026*** (0.001) | 0.021*** (0.002) | 0.018*** (0.001) | 0.027*** (0.001) | 0.026*** (0.001) | 0.021*** (0.002) | 0.018*** (0.001) |
 De facto (latent) | 0.022*** (0.001) | 0.022*** (0.001) | 0.022*** (0.001) | 0.022*** (0.001) | 0.022*** (0.001) | 0.022*** (0.002) | 0.023*** (0.001) | 0.022*** (0.001) |
Geography covariates | ||||||||
 Latitude |  | − 0.002 (0.001) | − 0.003*** (0.001) | − 0.004*** (0.001) |  | − 0.001 (0.002) | − 0.003* (0.001) | − 0.004*** (0.001) |
 Longitude |  | − 0.001** (0.0008) | − 0.003*** (0.0008) | − 0.005*** (0.0009) |  | −0.001** (0.0008) | − 0.003*** (0.0008) | − 0.005*** (0.0009) |
 Terrain ruggedness |  | − 0.045 (0.049) | − 0.021 (0.039) | − 0.056 (0.045) |  | − 0.037 (0.050) | − 0.019 (0.041) | 0.059 (0.048) |
 Soil quality |  | 0.0006 (0.002) | − 0.0006 (0.002) | − 0.001 (0.002) |  | 0.001 (0.002) | − 0.0005 (0.003) | 0.001 (0.003) |
 Desert |  | 0.008 (0.009) | − 0.006 (0.010) | − 0.027*** (0.009) |  | 0.014 (0.012) | − 0.005 (0.012) | − 0.025*** (0.009) |
 Tropical |  | 0.0002 (0.001) | 0.001 (0.001) | 0.003** (0.001) |  | 0.0008 (0.002) | 0.001 (0.001) | 0.003*** (0.001) |
 Distance to coast |  | 0.001 (0.001) | 0.003*** (0.001) | 0.003*** (0.001) |  | 0.001 (0.001) | 0.003*** (0.001) | 0.003** (0.001) |
 Landlocked |  | 0.263 (0.270) | 0.086 (0.192) | − 0.493** (0.206) |  | 0.232 (0.279) | 0.077 (0.197) | − 0.501** (0.212) |
 Precipitation |  | − 0.230** (0.106) | − 0.361*** (0.148) | − 0.242*** (0.068) |  | − 0.215* (0.118) | − 0.363*** (0.101) | − 0.239*** (0.082) |
Legal history covariates | ||||||||
 English common law |  |  | − 0.381*** (0.148) | − 0.653*** (0.147) |  |  | − 0.381*** (0.146) | − 0.652*** (0.143) |
 French civil law |  |  | − 0.528*** (0.131) | − 0.881*** (0.138) |  |  | − 0.529*** (0.131) | − 0.875*** (0.141) |
 German civil law |  |  | omitted | omitted |  |  | omitted | omitted |
 Scandinavian civil law |  |  | − 0.567*** (0.148) | − 0.817*** (0.160) |  |  | − 0.570*** (0.149) | − 0.810*** (0.179) |
Culture covariates | ||||||||
 Ethnic fractionalization |  |  |  | − 0.808*** (0.346) |  |  |  | − 0.789*** (0.339) |
 Linguistic fractionalization |  |  |  | 1.134*** (0.386) |  |  |  | 1.126*** (0.385) |
 Religious fractionalization |  |  |  | − 0.186 (0.202) |  |  |  | − 0.178 (0.225) |
 Constant term | 6.701*** (0.100) | 8.316*** (0.698) | 9.641*** (0.655) | 9.092*** (0.539) | 6.673*** (0.098) | 8.116*** (0.827) | 9.642*** (0.763) | 9.026*** (0.746) |
 Number of observations | 4564 | 4564 | 4564 | 4564 | 4401 | 4401 | 4401 | 4401 |
 Number of countries | 28 | 28 | 28 | 28 | 27 | 27 | 27 | 27 |
 Number of years | 163 | 163 | 163 | 163 | 163 | 163 | 163 | 163 |
 Wald test (p-value) | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 |
 Adjusted R2 | 0.73 | 0.76 | 0.77 | 0.78 | 0.74 | 0.76 | 0.77 | 0.78 |